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) Case No. 20000588-CA 
Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(c), Defendant, Third Party Plaintiff 
and Appellant, Insure-Rite, Inc., (hereinafter "Appellant"), by and through its specially-
appearing counsel of record John Martinez, hereby submits the following Reply Brief:1 
\ This Reply addresses the contentions in both Appellee Parkside's Brief and 
Appellees Wallace Associates & Collin Perkins' Brief. Appellant limits its responses to 
"new matter" in such Briefs. UTAH R. APP. PROC. 24(C). All other matter in Appellees' 
Briefs has been addressed in Appellant's Opening Brief, and Appellant will provide such 
additional briefing as necessary with leave of the Court pursuant to such Rule. 
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ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
This Reply by Tenant is structured according to Tenant's Opening Brief. Additional 
points raised by Landlord or Third-Party Defendants are addressed under the headings of 
Tenant's Opening Brief as well. 
POINT I 
BOTH THE NOTICE TO QUIT AND THE SUMMONS SERVED ON 
THE TENANT BY THE LANDLORD WERE STATUTORILY 
INSUFFICIENT, DEPRIVING THE TRIAL COURT OF 
JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE LANDLORD1 S EVICTION ACTION 
A. The Landlord did not provide an appropriate Notice to Quit, hence the Tenant 
was not in "unlawful detainer" under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-3(1), so the trial 
court erred by not dismissing the Landlord's action 
1. Section 22 of Original Lease: Landlord Parkside denies that the following provision 
of the lease converted the relationship of the parties into a month-to-month tenancy after the 
tenant remained on the premises after the end of the original term of the lease: 
"SECTION 22. HOLDING OVER 
Should Tenant, with or without Landlord's written consent hold over after the 
expiration of this Lease. Tenant shall pay, in advance, monthly rent at the rate 
of two hundred percent (200%) of one month's Basic Annual Rent, plus all 
Additional Rent provided by this Lease." (R. 34)(emphasis added) 
Landlord contends that this was a damages provision, not one creating a month-to-
month tenancy in the event the Tenant held over after the original lease term. (Landlord 
Brief, 31-35). First, by its plain terms, the clause is a month-to-month provision at double 
1 
the original monthly lease rent. The word "rent" appears three times in the clause, and 
payment of such "rent" on a monthly basis is required. By its terms, it matters not whether 
the Tenant stays over with or without the Landlord's consent—there are no other 
possibilities. 
Second, the Landlord took the position below that it was entitled to statutory treble 
damages, but on appeal takes the inconsistent position that this clause is a "damages" 
provision. Landlord thereby conveniently confuses the concepts of "damages" and "rent." 
In the event of improper holding over by a tenant, a landlord recovers back "rent" up to the 
end of the lease term, and in addition, recovers "damages" for the period after the end of the 
term. Forrester v. Cook, 77 Utah 137, 145, 292 P. 206, 214 (1930)("Rental value or 
reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises becomes an element of damages 
for retaining possession. This is not rent it is damages.") The lease rent amount is usually 
treated as the best indicator of reasonable rental value for purposes of damages. Id. Thus, if 
there had been no provision for damages in the lease, the landlord would have been entitled 
to recover treble the amount of the lease rent. That is the position the Landlord took below— 
and recovered treble damages. Section 22, on the other hand, would have allowed the 
landlord only twice the amount of lease rent. The Landlord was right the first time: Section 
22 is not a "damages" provision, but instead created a new tenancy, at the rental rate of twice 
the original lease rent. Thus, the Landlord was required to give the Tenant a 3-day Notice 
2 
to Quit, which the Landlord admits it did not provide. 
2. Interpretation of Lease, not New Contract: Landlord contends that Tenant "counter-
offered" by not "accepting" landlord's response to the Tenant's exercise of the Option to 
Extend the lease. (Landlord Brief, 35-36) This setting, however, is not a question of a new 
contract between strangers, but instead involves the interpretation of an Option to Extend 
between parties in an existing landlord and tenant relationship. Under the Option to Extend, 
therefore, the lease was extended for a 3-year term, and the tenant was entitled to a 3-day 
Notice to Quit because of underpayment of rent, which the Landlord did not provide. 
3. Unconscionability: Landlord claims that it is not unconscionable to give a business 
tenant the choice between accepting an unreasonable new lease or moving. (Landlord's 
Brief, 37). Under the circumstances herein, both choices were unconscionable. As the 
Landlord well knows, the tenant had expensive and sensitive computer equipment that had 
to be moved, and the business interruption involved was of no small moment. The fact that 
it was a business, therefore, did not lessen the unconscionability involved. A 15-day or a 5-
day Notice to Quit was required and was not provided. 
3 
B. The Summons served upon the Tenant by the Landlord was not "indorsed" or 
"changed in form" by the trial court as required by UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-8, 
so the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over the Tenant 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-8 provides that in Unlawful Detainer actions: 
"... The court shall indorse on the summons the number of days within which 
the defendant is required to appear and defend the action, which shall not be 
less than three or more than 20 days from the date of service. . . . The 
summons shall be changed in form to conform to the time of service as 
ordered, and shall be served as in other cases." (Emphasis added) 
1. Tenant's contention that the summons was not indorsed by the court 
("indorsement" requirement): Landlord argues (a) that substantial compliance suffices, and 
(b) that Tenant's filing a statutory possession bond to stay on the premises, and filing an 
Answer with counterclaims and third party claims after its motion to quash was denied, 
waived the defects in the summons. (Landlord Brief, 26-30). First, Landlord gives only a 
partial and misleading quotation from Glasmann v. Second Dist. Court, 12 P.2d 361, 363 
(Utah 1932), the only Utah case cited by Landlord for the proposition that substantial 
compliance suffices. (Landlord Brief, 27) The full quotation is set out below, with the part 
left out by the Landlord included here in bold and underline: 
"A summons may be sufficient to vest a court with jurisdiction of a defendant 
although it is not strictly in form prescribed by law, but the failure of a summons to 
inform the defendant of the court where he must appear is insufficient to confer 
jurisdiction of his person/' 
4 
Significantly, the portion omitted by the Landlord was contained in statute, and, as 
the court pointed out, "We have a statute, Comp. Laws Utah 1917, § 6539, which 
prescribes the form of summons in a civil action," Glasmann, supra. Similarly, there is a 
clear, unambiguous statute here. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-8 unquestionably requires that 
the court indorse the summons. Equally plainly, as in Glasmann, the failure to satisfy this 
requirement is insufficient to confer jurisdiction over the Tenant. As set out in Tenant's 
Opening Brief, since this is a landlord-tenant setting, Utah court decisions require strict not 
lax or merely "substantial" compliance. (Tenant's Opening Brief, 34-37) 
Second, Landlord's arguments that Tenant waived the defects in the summons makes 
a mockery of both landlord-tenant law and civil procedure rules. (Landlord Brief, 29-30) The 
relevant sequence of events is: (1) August 3, 1998, Tenant filed a Motion to Quash the 
Summons (R. 98-99), (2) August 13, 1998, in response to Landlord's eviction bond, Tenant 
filed a counter-bond to remain on the premises (R. 130-136), (3) October 26,1998, Tenant's 
Motion to Quash was denied (oral ruling at hearing (R. 1045, p. 16, lines 16-19, Transcript 
at Addendum 12 to Appellant's Opening Brief) and confirmed at the hearing on Nov. 13, 
1998, "Your client received the proper summons. That is my ruling on that. That was my 
ruling before." (Emphasis added)(R. 1041, p. 17, lines 2-4, Transcript at Addendum 13 to 
Appellant's Opening Brief) and by written order on the same day (R. 761-63), then (4) 
November 10,19981 Tenant filed its counterclaims and third-party complaint (R. 612-707). 
5 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-8.5(2)(b) expressly gives a tenant the right to remain on 
the premises during the eviction proceedings by filing a counter-bond within "three days 
from the date he is served with" a landlord's eviction bond. No Utah case requires that a 
Tenant must suffer immediate eviction in order to preserve the right to challenge a defective 
summons. Landlord would put tenants to the choice of giving up one statutory right 
(remaining on the premises by filing a counter-bond), in order to enforce another (demanding 
that the landlord's summons meets statutory requirements). That is not good law or policy. 
Similarly, Utah law does not require a tenant whose Motion to Quash Summons has 
been denied to waive counterclaims or third-party claims in order to challenge the defective 
summons. Tenant's Motion to Quash was denied on October 26, 1998 and confirmed at the 
November 13, 1998 hearing by the trial judge in no uncertain terms. A ruling on a Motion 
to Quash Summons is not an appealable order. State Tax Comm'n v. Larsen, 100 Utah 103, 
105, 110 P.2d 558, 560 (Utah 1941) Thus, Tenant could not take an appeal from the ruling 
on the Motion to Quash. Nonetheless, Tenant was placed under an obligation to file an 
answer within 7 days of the Landlord's service of the very summons Tenant was challenging, 
because Landlord had sought a shortened time for Tenant's response under UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 78-36-8. Moreover, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a) required Tenant to serve its 
Answer within twenty days of service of the landlord's summons, and further, URCP 12(b) 
required that "Every . . . claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, 
6 
cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one 
is required...." Thus, Tenant was obligated to file its answer, and to include its counterclaims 
and third-party complaint therein. 
URCP 12(b), however, expressly provides that, 
"No defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other defenses 
or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the denial 
of such motion or objection. "(Emphasis added) 
Finally, and most to the point, URCP 12(i) provides: 
"The filing of a responsive pleading after the denial of any motion made pursuant to 
these rules shall not be deemed a waiver of such motion."(Emphasis added) 
Utah R. C. Proc. 12(i) 
Therefore, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure expressly provide that Tenant's filing 
of counterclaims and third-party complaint after its Motion to Quash was denied by the trial 
court was not a waiver of the objections to the Summons contained in the Motion to Quash. 
The contrary rule advanced by Landlord would force Tenant to suffer an adverse judgment 
on the merits before being able to obtain appellate review of the ruling on the Motion to 
Quash, but if the Tenant were ultimately proved wrong on the jurisdictional issue, Tenant 
would have waived all its claims and defenses by failing to assert them in a responsive 
pleading after the denial of the Motion to Quash. Utah's more sensible Rule 12(i) is followed 
in the federal courts through judicial interpretation, and also wholeheartedly supported by 
Wright & Miller. E ^ , Campbell v. Bartlett 975 F.2d 1569, 1574 (10th Cir. 1992); Bavou 
7 
Steel Corp. v. M/V Amstelvoorn. 809 F.2d 1147,1148 (5th Cir. 1987); Neifeld v. Steinberg. 
438 F.2d 423, 429 (3rd Cir. 1971); 5 C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure, Civil § 1397, at 878-80 (1969). 
2. Tenant's contention that the trial court did not change the summons in form as 
required ("change" requirement): Landlord argues (a) that the Landlord, not the Court, could 
change the summons to shorten the time for Tenant's answer to 7 days. (Landlord Brief, 30-
31. That is contrary to the terms and spirit of UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-8, which requires 
court oversight of the shortening of time to answer. Such power for Landlords is nowhere 
mentioned in that statute. Landlord also argues (b) that Tenant has not preserved this issue 
for appeal. (Landlord Brief, 31) On the contrary, a "matter is sufficiently raised if it is 
submitted to the trial court, and the court is afforded an opportunity to rule on the issue." 
State v. Starnes. 841 P.2d 712, 716 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)(citation omitted) The issue must 
be raised in a timely fashion, specifically, and with supporting evidence or relevant legal 
authority. Hart v. Salt Lake County Com'n. 945 P.2d 125. 130 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) In State 
v. Starnes. supra, the court held that an issue was preserved for appeal even though the words 
"due process" nor the language of the relevant code section were expressly referred to by 
counsel. Tenant in this case did more. In its Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Quash, 
Tenant stated, "§ 78-36-8 . . . mandates that the Court shall indorse upon the Summons the 
number of days that the defendant has in order to provide the responsive pleading to the 
8 
complaint."(Emphasis added) (R. 101) The trial court in its written order denying the Motion 
to Quash acknowledged that it "considered the legal memoranda in support and in 
opposition" to the motion. (R.762). This preserved the "change" requirement for appeal. 
POINT II 
IN GRANTING THE LANDLORD'S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT FOR POSSESSION AND DAMAGES, THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED BY PROCEEDING WITHOUT PERSONAL 
JURISDICTION OVER THE TENANT, BY DECIDING ISSUES OF 
FACT, AND BY TREBLING DAMAGES 
A. The trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over the Tenant 
Landlord does not seriously dispute in its Brief that if the Notice to Quit or Summons 
were improper, then the trial court had no power to further adjudicate the action. 
B. The trial court erroneously decided genuine issues of material fact on summary 
judgment 
1. Issues of fact improperly decided in summary judgment for possession 
Landlord contends that all facts were undisputed and that only the application of law 
to facts remained. (Landlord Brief, 17-23) Landlord, unsurprisingly perhaps, arrives at this 
contention by interpreting the lease terms and the conduct of the parties in a manner most 
favorable to the Landlord, then proceeding to give legal effect to that interpretation. 
(Landlord Brief, 17-18) For example, landlord argues that it "was under no obligation to 
negotiate the new rental rate with [Tenant]. Instead, it was simply obligated to propose a new 
rental rate, which it did." (Landlord Brief, 22) The meaning of lease terms is a 
9 
quintessential^ factual question. Landlord, as did the trial court, merely selected an 
interpretation of the lease and did not give Tenant an opportunity to present evidence for a 
contrary interpretation. Disposition of the case by summary judgment was improper. 
2. Issues of fact improperly decided in summary judgment for damages 
Landlord persists in mixing apples and oranges by arguing that since Tenant proposed 
a new rental rate of $17.00 per square foot for the exercise of the 3-year extension of the 
lease pursuant to the Option to Extend (apples), and since Landlord agreed to a $17.00 rate 
as the measure of damages (oranges), then there was no factual dispute about the measure 
of damages. On the contrary, it is clear that a landlord's recovery in an unlawful detainer 
proceeding includes unpaid back "rent" through the end of the lease term, plus "damages" 
for the period after the end of the lease term during which the tenant improperly stays in the 
premises. Forrester v. Cook 77 Utah 137, 145, 292 P. 206, 214 (1930)("Rental value or 
reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises becomes an element of damages 
for retaining possession. This is not rent it is damages.") In determining the proper measure 
of damages, the original lease rent amount is viewed as the best indicator of "reasonable 
rental value" for purposes of those damages. Id. But it is still "damages," not "rent" that is 
at issue. Thus, Tenant argued in its Objection to Parkside's Motion for Summary Judgment 
or in the Alternative Memorandum in Opposition: 
"In the case at hand, material issues of fact exist regarding the fair market value of the 
leased space in question. The lease agreement, which is evidence of the fair market 
10 
rental value, shows the value of the leased space is $16.15 per square foot. The 
Affidavit of Kenneth Stuart shows the fair rental value of the space [for purposes of 
the 3-year extension of the lease] is $17.00 per square foot. Parkside, however, asserts 
that the fair rental value is $18.00 per square foot. The per square foot differences in 
these amounts are significant. It is clear that a genuine issue of material fact exists 
which precludes summary judgment." (Emphasis added)(R. 925-26) 
Landlord's statement, therefore, that "there was clearly no dispute between the parties 
as to the fact that fair market rental value of the Premises was at least $ 17.00 per square foot" 
is a transparent attempt to massage a genuine issue of material fact out of existence. 
(Landlord Brief, 23) 
C. The trial court erroneously trebled damages 
Landlord argues that the damages were not constitutionally excessive here. (Landlord 
Brief, 25) The trial court assessed $108,417.24 in damages. Even calculated at the 
Landlord's suggested rate of $18.00 per month, a reasonable rental recoveiy would have 
been $37,777.50 (($18.00 x 5,037 sq. ft.) /12) x 5 months). Thus, Landlord recovered 
$70,639.74 over and above the fair rental rate to which it claims it was entitled. That is 
obviously constitutionally unconscionable. 
11 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO STAY 
ENFORCEMENT OF ITS SUMMARY JUDGMENTS, IN ITS GRANT 
OF ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS TO THE LANDLORD, AND IN 
DISMISSING THE TENANTS COUNTERCLAIMS AND THIRD-
PARTY COMPLAINT 
A. The trial court abused its discretion in refusing to stay enforcement of its 
summary judgment rulings 
Landlord argues that the trial court's orders refusing to stay enforcement of the 
eviction and damages summary judgments are moot. (Landlord Brief, 37) On the contrary, 
if Tenant was improperly evicted and such order was not stayed pending appeal, then Tenant 
has suffered additional damages as a result of having to relocate. Moreover, payment of an 
unlawful judgment of damages also is not moot, since such money will have to be returned, 
with interest. 
Refusal to stay such judgments was an abuse of the discretion conferred upon the trial 
court under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 62(h). Tenant was given no opportunity to ask for 
a stay of the trial court's summary judgment for possession, since Tenant was ordered to 
vacate "forthwith". ("THE COURT: Forthwith. No grace period.")(Hearing on Nov. 13, 
1998, R. 1041, p. 18, line 23, Transcript at Addendum 13 to Appellant's Opening Brief) With 
respect to the summary judgment for damages, Tenant offered in its Motion to Stay 
Enforcement to provide whatever bond was necessary to assure Landlord was held harmless. 
(R. 1178) The trial court denied that as well. 
12 
B. The trial court erred in granting attorneys fees and costs to the Landlord 
1. Award of attorneys fees and costs was improper because of the invalidity 
of the underlying rulings on summary judgment 
Landlord does not seriously contest that if the underlying rulings on summary 
judgment were invalid, so were all subsequent orders based upon them. (Landlord Brief, 39) 
2. Award of attorneys fees and costs was improper because the trial court 
made no findings regarding the reasonableness of such fees and costs 
Landlord contends that Tenant "never objected to the amount of fees awarded nor did 
it ever raise any specified argument with respect to the attorneys' fees beyond the general 
argument that the attorneys fees was improper due to the court's erroneous entry of summary 
judgment." (Landlord Brief, 40) Landlord apparently overlooked Tenant's Notice of and 
Objection to Supplemental Order as to Amount of Attorney's [sic: Fees] to be Awarded to 
Plaintiff, in which Tenant thoroughly set out the objection, the requirement of a hearing and 
findings, and the necessary findings required. (R. 1294-1298) (Reply Addendum Exhibit 1) 
Tenant further preserved its objections by its Continuing Objection to Award of Attorneys 
Fees (R. 1447-1449)(Reply Addendum Exhibit 2) 
Landlord further argues that no findings were necessary and that moreover, 
appropriate findings were made. (Landlord Brief, 40-41) Landlord's citation of cases holding 
no need for findings in summary judgment settings generally, however, are inapposite. 
Landlord does not address the cases cited in Tenant's Opening Brief (pages 47-48) 
13 
specifically holding that findings are required with respect to awards of attorneys fees. 
According to those specifically applicable standards, the trial court's orders with respect to 
attorney's fees must be reversed. 
C. The trial court erred in dismissing the Tenant's counterclaims and third-party 
complaint 
Landlord makes two contentions: (1) that the counterclaims against it did not state 
claims for relief and (2) that even if they did, they were precluded by issue preclusion. Third-
Party Defendants, Perkins and Wallace & Associates, join the Landlord in making the 
second contention with respect to the Third-Party Complaint. 
First, Under Utah R.Civ.P. 8(a), "a pleader is required only to make a short and plain 
statement of his claim." Blackham v. Snelgrove. 3 Utah 2d 157, 160, 280 P.2d 453, 454 
(1955)(quoting Burr v. Childs, 1 Utah 2d 199, 204, 265 P.2d 383, 387 (1953)). "[A] 
complaint is required only to " ... give the opposing party fair notice of the nature and basis 
or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type of litigation involved. Blackham 
v. Snelgrove. 3 Utah 2d at 160, 280 P.2d at 455 (quoting 1 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 255 at 431-34 (I960)). Tenant's counterclaims (and Third-Party 
Complaint as well) amply meet this standard. This Court should remand for consideration 
of statement of claims to the trial court, which has not considered that question, but instead 
ruled only that preclusion foreclosed such claims. 
14 
Second, both the Landlord and the Third-Party Defendants misperceive the issue at 
hand with respect to the effect of the summary judgment rulings on the ruling with respect 
to the counterclaims and third-party complaint. This is a case about determining the scope 
of prior summary judgment rulings in order to decide whether and how such rulings affect 
a subsequent ruling on motions to dismiss in the same case by the same trial court. As such, 
this case is about the "law of the case" doctrine, not issue or claim preclusion rules. Thurston 
v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034,1038 n.2(Utah 1995)("Law of the case terminology has 
been applied to a number of distinct sets of problems, each with a separate analysis."); see 
generally Joan Steinman, Law of the Case: A Judicial Puzzle in Consolidated Cases and in 
Multidistrict Litigation. 135 U. Pa. L.Rev. 595 (1987). The Utah Supreme Court in Timm 
v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178 (Utah 1993) addressed the threshold question of how to 
determine the scope of a prior summary judgment ruling in order to decide whether such 
ruling included decision of counterclaims and a third party claim. Timm sets out the standard 
for making that threshold determination, and makes a sharp distinction between that 
threshold question and issue and claim preclusion rules. 
In Timm. a debtor filed counterclaims in a foreclosure action by foreclosing lenders. 
The trial court granted summary judgment for the lenders, but did not mention the 
counterclaims. When the debtor later sought to amend the counterclaims, (which is the 
equivalent of the Tenant's assertion of counterclaims and third-party claims herein), the trial 
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court denied the request on the ground that it had "implicitly" denied the counterclaims when 
it granted summary judgment to the lenders. Id., at 1180 On appeal, the lenders contended 
(a) that the summary judgment included determination of the counterclaims and (b) that the 
debtor was collaterally estopped from litigating the counterclaims because they had been 
raised and litigated in an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy court. Id., at 1184 With 
respect to the lenders' first contention, and emphasizing that summary judgment should be 
narrowly construed because it deprives a litigant of a trial on the merits, the Court in Timm 
v. Dewsnup said: 
"This contention requires us to examine what issues were raised by the counterclaim 
and what issues were resolved by the summary judgment. 
. . . [W]e are led to conclude that... the grant of summary judgment implicitly 
and necessarily constituted an adverse ruling on that part of the counterclaim that 
sought reformation to exclude the Arrow contract as security in the loan transaction. 
See Ford Motor Co. v. Transport Indemnity Co., 795 F.2d 538, 543 (6th Cir.1986) 
(if district couif s ruling on one claim necessarily precludes alternative or mutually 
exclusive claim, final order will arise despite lack of explicit declaration by district 
court). 
However, in accordance with the policy that the procedure for summary 
judgment should be strictly observed, we conclude that nothing else was implicitly 
adjudicated by the grant of summary judgment. 
Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d at 1182 (Emphasis added). 
Similarly, the summary judgment rulings on possession and damages by the court 
below necessarily determined (albeit erroneously) only that the Landlord was entitled to 
possession and statutory damages. They did not determine the Tenant's counterclaims 
against the Landlord: Breach of Contract, Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith & Fair 
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Dealing, Fraud, Intentional Interference With Existing and Prospective Economic Relations, 
Civil Conspiracy, Constructive Eviction, violation of the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act, 
and Retaliatory Eviction. (R. 612-707) They also did not determine the Tenant's third-party 
claims against the real estate agent and real estate brokerage involved in the transaction: 
Fraud, Intentional Interference With Existing and Prospective Economic Relations, Civil 
Conspiracy and violation of the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act. (R. 612-707) This is 
particularly apparent with respect to the claims that arose from conduct prior to the execution 
of the lease and with respect to the Landlord's and third-party defendants' conduct in 
preventing the Tenant from obtaining the benefit of the Option to Extend clause in the lease. 
Third, unlike in the Timm case, there was no "prior adjudication" in this case, so 
preclusion rules do not apply. Even if preclusion principles applied, the trial court's summary 
judgment ruling for possession to the landlord did not preclude the Tenant's counterclaims 
and Third-Party Complaint. A lease is both a conveyance and a contract, and whereas the 
parties' privity of estate may be terminated by an eviction, claims arising from their 
contractual obligations remain. Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.. 776 P.2d 896, 900 n.2 
(1989). The trial court's eviction of the Tenant, even if lawful, therefore did not preclude the 
Tenant's counterclaims against the Landlord which arose from contract, tort and statutory 
obligations. A fortiori, such eviction of the Tenant could not preclude the Tenant's claims 
against the Third-Party Defendants, with whom the Tenant was never in privity of estate. For 
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similar reasons, the trial court's summary judgment ruling for damages to the landlord did 
not preclude the Tenant's counterclaims and Third-Party Complaint, since such damages by 
definition were the result of the determination of unlawful detainer. UTAH CODE § 78-36-
10(2)("court...shall assess the damages resulting...from...unlawful detainer..."). 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the final judgment and all antecedent rulings by the trial 
court. Appellees should be taxed with costs on appeal. 
DATED this ^5Tday of February, 2001. 
7pHN MARTINEZ 
attorney for Appellant-tenant Insure-Rite, Inc. 
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REPLY ADDENDUM 
Reply Exhibit 1: [Tenant's] Notice of and Objection to Supplemental Order as to 
Amount of Attorney's [sic: Fees] to be Awarded to Plaintiff (R. 
1294-1298) 
Reply Exhibit 2: [Tenant's] Continuing Objection to Award of Attorneys Fees (R. 
1447-1449) 
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REPLY EXHIBIT 1 
NICK J. COLESSIDES (# 696) 
Attorney at Law 
466 South 400 East, # 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3325 
Tele: (801) 521-4441 
Fax: (801) 521-4452 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Insure-Rite, Inc. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PARKSIDE SALT LAKE CORP. 
a Utah, corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
INSURE-RITE, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Defendant. 
INSURE-RITE, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
v. 
COLLIN PERKINS, an 
individual, and WALLACE 
ASSOCIATES, 
Third Party Defendants 
NOTICE OF AND 
DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO 
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER 
AS TO AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY'S 
TO BE AWARDED TO PLAINTIFF 
Case NO.: 98 09 06982 
Judge: Stephen L. Henriod 
Defendant above named by and through its attorney of record, 
D:\WPDOCS\ins\parkside v m s u r i t e l i t . l 7 . w p d 
pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Rules of Judicial 
Administration, hereby objects to the entry of the proposed 
''Supplemental Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment", and respectfully represents to the Court as follows: 
The Court has ruled that Plaintiff is entitled to attorney's 
fees and costs in connection with Plaintiff's motion for summary 
j udgment. 
However, the amount of attorney's fees to be awarded to the 
Plaintiff has not been determined by the Court, and, therefore, the 
amount as set forth in the proposed order should not be granted. 
It is respectfully submitted that pursuant to and in 
accordance with the authorities listed hereinbelow, to-wit: Salmon 
v. Davis County. 916 P. 2d 890 (1996) ; Brown v. Richards. 840 P.2d 
143, 155 (Utah App. 1992); In LMV Leasing Inc. v. Conlin. 805 P. 2d 
189 (Utah App.. 1991);; FMA Fin. Corp v. Build, Inc.. 404 P.2d 670, 
673 (Utah 1965); Thacher v. Industrial Comm'n. 115 Utah 568, 207 
P.2d 178, 183-84 (1949), Plaintiff has failed to meet its burden to 
prove the amount that Plaintiff should be awarded. 
Furthermore, Plaintiff has not provided to the trial court 
sufficient information in order to allow the trial court to make 
adequate findings as to the amount of the award of attorney's fees. 
It is therefore necessary that before an amount for the 
attorney's fees be entered as a judgment against the Defendant, the 
D \WPDOCS\ms\parkside v m s u r i t e l i t 17 wpd ^ 
Court must hold a hearing, and for the Court to make detailed 
findings in support of a fee award. 
It is respectfully submitted that Utah law mandates that the 
Court holds hearing in this matter, where Defendant may have an 
opportunity to examine the signer of the affidavits relating to: 
a) What legal work was actually performed; 
b) How much of the work performed was reasonably 
necessary to adequately prosecute the matter; 
c) Is the attorney's billing rate consistent with 
the rates customarily charged in the locality for similar 
services; 
d) In view of the enormity of the requested amount 
(i.e. $33,823.50) for the award, for what essentially is 
merely an unlawfully detainer action, are there 
circumstances which require consideration of additional 
factors, including those listed in the Code of 
Professional Responsibility, 
and, for the Court to have an opportunity to make detailed findings 
in supporting whatever the award for attorney's fees may be 
determined to be. 
Accordingly, the Court should set the matter for hearing at 
such time as convenient to the Court, and for the Court to hear the 
evidence, and for the Court to make an appropriate determination as 
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t o the amount. 
2S1 +~ Dated this £^1 day of June, 1999. 
NICK 
Attarafiey for Defendant 
above named. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Filed the original of the foregoing with: 
Clerk of the Court 
Scott M. Matheson Courthouse 
450 South State Street 
P. 0. Box 1860 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1860 
and served a copy thereof to the following, addressed as listed 
hereinbelow: 
MR GREGGORY J SAVAGE ESQ 
MR MATTHEW N EVANS ESQ 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN 
111 EAST BROADWAY SUITE 110 0 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
this fr\ day of June, 1999, via first class mail, postage pre-
paid. 
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REPLY EXHIBIT 2 
NICK J. COLESSIDES (USBA #696) 
Attorney at Law 
466 South 400 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3325 
Tele: 801.521.4441 
Fax: 801.521.4452 
JOHN MARTINEZ (USBA #4523) 
Attorney at Law 
2974 East St. Mary's Circle 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 
Tele: 801.582.1386 
Fax: 801.582.7664 
Attorneys for Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff 
Insure-Rite, Inc. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PARKSIDE SALT LAKE CORP., a 
Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
INSURE-RITE, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
INSURE-RITE, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
v. 
COLLIN PERKINS, an individual, 
and WALLACE & ASSOCIATES, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff Insure-Rite, Inc. 
i i l l - Lt J 
CONTINUING OBJECTION TO 
AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES 
Case No. 98 09 06982 
Judge Stephen L. Henriod 
(hereinafter "Insure-Rite") , by and through its specially-appearing 
counsel of record John Martinez, pursuant to Rule 4-504(2) of the 
UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, hereby submits its continuing 
objection to Plaintiff Parkside Salt Lake Corporation's "Third 
Supplemental" and all prior requests for attorney's fees in this 
matter. Plaintiff is not entitled to attorneys fees because the 
trial court orders upon which such fees requests are based were 
erroneous as a matter of law. The trial court has already denied 
Insure-Rite's motions, oppositions to Plaintiff's motions, and 
oppositions to the Third-Party Defendant's motions in that regard, 
however, so Insure-Rite through this objection hereby preserves the 
right to challenge such legality through appropriate appeals. 
DATED this 3 day of May 2 000. 
y^6m\ MAR'TINETZ j 
/^Attorney fop Insure-Rite, Inc. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Filed the original of the foregoing with the Clerk of the 
Court: 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
450 SOUTH STATE STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
84111 
and served a copy of the foregoing upon the following: 
Matthew N. Evans, Esq. 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN 
111 East Broadway, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee Parkside Salt Lake Corp.) 
John E.S. Robson 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
215 South State Street 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
(Attorneys for Third Party Defendants-Appellees Collin Perkins and 
Wallace Associates) 
via first class mail, postage pre-paid, this ^3 day of May 2 000 
addressed as set forth hereinabove. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Filed the original of the foregoing and nine copies with the Clerk of the Court of 
Appeals: 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF THE COURT 
COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
450 SOUTH STATE STREET, FIFTH FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
84111-1860 
and served two copies of the foregoing upon each of the following: 
Matthew N. Evans, Esq. 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN 
111 East Broadway, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(Attorneys for Appellee Landlord Parkside Salt Lake Corp.) 
J. David Pearce 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
215 South State Street 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
(Attorneys for Third Party Defendants-Appellees Collin Perkins and Wallace Associates) 
via first class mail, postage pre-paid, this £_ day of February, 2001, addressed as set forth 
above. 
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